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In   this   paper,   we   investigate   the   empirical   relationship   between   corporate  
governance  and  information  asymmetry  across  a  range  of  French  firms.  
Based   on   a   cross-­‐sectional   analysis,   our   study   of   the   empirical   relationship  
between   corporate   governance   and   information   asymmetry   involved   160  
companies  over  the  years  2008-­‐2010.     Mechanisms  of  corporate  governance  
include  the  characteristics  of  the  board  of  directors.    
Our   results   seem   to   indicate   a   significant   relationship   between   certain  
mechanisms  of  corporate  governance  and  the   information  asymmetry  of  the  
French  market.   These  mechanisms   can   reduce   adverse   selection   costs,   and  
make  exchanges  more  transparent.  
These   results   suggest   that   firms   with   efficient   corporate   governance  
mechanisms   may   reduce   informative   asymmetry   and   improve   transparency  
between  investors.    





The   impact   of   corporate   governance   mechanisms   on   transparency   is   generally   explained,   in  
research,   in   terms   of   the   increases   risk   of   that   an   investor  making   an   adverse   selection   in   a  
context   of   asymmetric   information   (Glosten   and   Milgrom,   1985).   &??? ?ŚĞ ŝ??Ğ??????
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perspective,   the   only   guarantee   of   accuracy   of   disclosed   information   is   good   corporate  
governance.  In  fact,  several  researchers  state  that  this  concept  makes  it  possible  to  potentially  
reduce   information  asymmetry.  The  potential   for  conflicts  of   interest  between  managers  and  
shareholders,  the  possibility  of  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders,  and  embezzlement  are  
thereby   weakened.   Consequently,   there   will   be   fewer   opportunities   for   informed   parties   to  
take  advantage  of  private  information  available  to  them  at  the  expense  of  uninformed  parties.  
Therefore,   uninformed   agents   will   find   no   interest   in   broadening   the   adverse   selection  
component  of  the  spread.  
In   this   context,   it   is   important   to   remember   that   a   system  of   efficient   corporate   governance  
raises   investor   confidence   in   the   market,   and   furthers   the   establishment   of   more   stable  
investment  flows  in  the  long  run.  This  is  a  lever  for  establishing  a  relationship  of  trust  between  
the  company  and  investors,  thereby  attracting  new  investors.  Moreover,  the  recent  turbulence  
in   financial   markets   has   underlined   how   important   it   is   to   adopt   good   forms   of   corporate  
governance.  
Corporate   governance   is   thus   conceived   as   a   set   of  mechanisms  which  makes   it   possible   to  
reduce   agency   costs   by   controlling   managerial   actions,   and   by   reducing   the   asymmetry   of  
information  borne  by  the  shareholders.  In  fact,  managers  of  a  business  with  weak  governance  
increasingly   expropriate   the  wealth   of   shareholders   in   situations   of   poor   performance   (Chen  
and   Al,   2003).   Thus,   good   corporate   governance   produces   a   cash-­‐flow   that   is   both   high   and  
available  to  investors.  
In   this   study,   our   goal   was   to   analyze   mechanisms   of   governance   that   can   improve   the  
transparency  of  companies.  This  sphere  of  research  is  usually  based  on  theoretical  foundations  
such  as  agency  theory  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976),  the  theory  of  entrenchment  (Shleifer  and  
Vishny,   1989)   and   stewardship   theory   (Davis   and   al.,   1997).   These   theories   justify   the  
relationship   between   the  modes   of   governance   and   asymmetric   information.      Charoenwong  
and  al.  (2010)  are  unusual  in  having  studied  the  effect  of  governance  quality  on  price  spread,  in  
the  specific  context  of  Singapore.  They  found  that  the  mechanisms  of  governance  studied  had  a  
significant  and  negative  relationship  with  the  information  asymmetry  component.  
This   research   is   innovative   in   its   approach,   studying   the   effect   of   different   governance  
mechanisms   on   asymmetric   information   in   an   order   driven   market,   in   a   context   where  
information   asymmetry   is   exacerbated   by   the   presence   of   insiders   (family,   majority  
shareholders,   and   institutional   investors)   combined   with   a   weak   protection   of   minority  
interests.    
This  article   is  organized  as  follows:  the  first  section  presents  the  theoretical  framework  of  the  
relationship   between   mechanisms   of   governance   and   information   asymmetry.   The   second  
presents   the   sample   and   methodology   used,   followed   by   results   and   discussions.   The   last  
section  concludes  the  paper.  
  
1. Literature  review  and  Hypotheses  Development  
  
1.1.  French  corporate  governance  landscape  
Family   firms   dominate   the   French   corporate   landscape   and   feature   highly   concentrated  
ownership   structures.   Faccio   and   Lang   (2002)   demonstrated   that   family   firms   accounted   for  
roughly  65%  of  French  listed  firms  in  1996.  Boubaker  (2007)  found  that  family  firms  accounted  
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for  69.61%  of  French  listed  firms  in  2000,  90%  of  which  were  run  by  members  of  the  controlling  
family.   In   France,   as   in   other   Western   Continental   European   countries   where   ownership  
structure   is   highly   concentrated,   listed   firms   appear   to   be   reluctant   to   voluntarily   provide  
investors   with   extra   information   and   prefer   private   communication   channels   to   public  
disclosure.  Such  conditions  motivate  us  to  study  the  corporate  governance  characteristics  that  
encourage  voluntary  disclosure  in  France,  thus  mitigating  information  asymmetry.  
Several  codes  of  best-­‐practice  for  corporate  governance  have  been  established  in  France  since  
the  mid-­‐1990s  to  enforce  minority  shareholder  rights  and  improve  market  transparency.  These  
codes,   including   the   Viénot   reports   (1995,   1998)   and   the   Bouton   report   (2002),   create   a  
blueprint  of  corporate  governance.  They  have  encouraged  French  firms  to  appoint  independent  
directors,  separate  the  functions  of  chief  executive  officer  (CEO)  and  chair  of  the  board,  create  
board  committees,  and  voluntarily  disclose  more  information  to  improve  market  transparency  
and  attract  shareholders  back  to  the  financial  markets.  In  2003,  the  French  Parliament  adopted  
the  Financial  Security  Law  to  uphold   and  strengthen  the   legal  provisions   related  to  corporate  
governance.   This   law   -­‐   in   the   spirit   of   the   Sarbanes-­‐Oxley   Act   -­‐   aims   to   increase   CEO  
responsibilities,   promote   internal   control,   and   reduce   or   eliminate   sources   of   conflict   of  
interests.   Notwithstanding   the   newly   enacted   laws   and   recently   adopted   governance   codes,  
businesses   failures   and   accounting   scandals   continue   to   surface,   shaking   confidence   in   the  
French   corporate  environment   (e.g.,  Vivendi  Universal   and   the   Sentier   II   financial   scandals   in  
2001  and  the  Autorité  des  Marchés  Financiers  (AMF)  penalties  against  BNP  Paribas  and  Société  
Générale   in  2007).   Examining   the   financial   reporting  practices  of  CAC   40   firms   in  2004,   Fitch  
Ratings   (2004)   concluded   that   these   firms   can   do   better   in   terms  of   financial   disclosure   and  
accountability.  The  study  also  observed  significant  differences  in  the  content  of  annual  reports  
across  these  firms,  though  without  explaining  the  reasons  for  these  disparities.  
  
1.2.  Theoretical  framework  
The  identification  of  organizational  problems  arising  from  a  situation  of  information  asymmetry  
was   one   factor   leading   to   the   emergence   of   corporate   governance.   In   this   sense,   Attig   and  
Morck  (2005)  argue  that  in  the  case  of  companies  whose  boards  are  ineffective,  the  asymmetry  
of   information  may  be  more  troubling  to  shareholders  because   it  usually  results   in   significant  
opacity.  In  other  words,  external  investors  may  fear  a  significant  difference  between  what  they  
know  and  what  other  investors  may  have  learned  about.  Indeed,  they  find   that  if  the  board  is  
working   effectively,   the   level   of   information   asymmetry   should   be   small   (i.e.   less   informed  
trading,  shares  are  actively  traded).  So,  an  effective  board  should  improve  the  transparency  of  
information  and  reduce  both  the  diversion  and  the  expropriation  of  minority  interests.    
The  effectiveness  of  the  board  of  directors   is  often  conditioned  by  characteristics  such  as  size  
and  the  independence  of  directors:  
  
The  size  of  the  Board  of  Directors  
Agency  theory  relies  on  the  assumption   that  a   large  sized  board  favors  the  dominance  of  the  
leader   by   raising   coalitions   and   group   conflicts.   This   results   in   fragmented   board   that   have  
difficulty   functioning   effectively   and   reaching   consensus   on   decisions.   In   this   context,   Jensen  
(1993)  recommends  small  sized  boards.  This  means  that  potential  manipulation  of  assessments  
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by   the  directors   is  greatly   facilitated,   leading   to  a   lower  quality  of  published   information  and  
aggravating  the  problem  of  information  asymmetry.  
However,   according   to   resource   dependence   theory,   improving   relationships   between  
companies  and  different  stakeholders  is  made  possible  under  an  expanded  Council.  This  allows  
easy   access   to   in-­‐house   expertise   and   better   communication   with   investors.   Agrawal   and  
Knoeber  (1999)  confirmed  this  hypothesis  and  suggest  that  a  large  board  size  is  more  suited  to  
businesses  where   information   is   difficult   to   obtain.   Anderson   et   al.   (2004)   argued   that   if   the  
large   size   of   a   board   provides   greater   oversight   of   the   financial   accounting   process,   the  
company  will  consequently  offer  better  transparency.  According  to  this  argument,  a  large  board  
size  reduces  problems  of  asymmetric  information  and  allows  investors  to  adjust  their  subjective  
probability   distributions.   Using   a   sample   of   UK   firms   during   the   period   1999-­‐2003,   Cai   et  
al.(2006)  showed  that  adverse  selection  is  lower  when  the  size  of  the  board  is  high.  
Taking   into  account   the  structure  of  ownership,  Attig   (2007)   tested   the   relationship  between  
adverse   selection   and   characteristics   of   the  board   of  directors   in   Canadian   listed   companies.  
The   study   demonstrated   that   the   impact   of   board   size   on   price   spread   depends   on   the  
ownership   structure.   In   fact,   companies   with   dispersed   ownership   and   a   large   board   were  
shown  to  be  associated  with  a   low  price  spread.  However  when   it  comes  to  pyramidal   family  
business  groups,  Attig  (2007)  found  that  the  size  of  the  board  and  the  excessive  control  of  the  
directors  widen  the  price  spread.  The  variable  (boardSiz)  represents  the  number  of  directors  on  
the  board,  for  each  company  in  the  sample.  
H1:  The  degree  of  information  asymmetry  is  negatively  associated  with  the  size  of  the  board    
  
The  Independence  of  Directors  
Broadly  speaking,  the   role  of  directors   is   to  monitor  the  tasks  performed  by  management,   to  
oppose  bad  decisions,  and  to  provide  advice  at  a  high  level.  The  independence  of  directors  has  
been  the  subject  of  much  debate   in  corporate  governance   literature.  Since  the  work  of  Fama  
and  Jensen  (1983),   it  has  been  widely  agreed  that  the  independence  of  the  board  of  directors  
and  its  degree  of  effectiveness  are  linked.  Rooting  theory  predicts  that  external  directors  do  not  
have   sufficient  power   to  oppose   any   strategies  used  by   leaders   to  enhance   their  power,  and  
that  of  their  partners,  including  the  development  of  asymmetric  information.  In  this  framework,  
Fama   (1980)   and   Fama   and   Jensen   (1983)   argued   that   the  most   influential   members   in   the  
council  naturally  have  to  be   internal  members,  since   they  have  valid  and  specific   information  
regarding   the   activity   of   the   organization.   This   information   is   primarily   obtained   by   internal  
mutual  supervision  of  other  managers.  Furthermore,  Eng  and  Mak  (2003)  found  that  increasing  
the  proportion  of  external  directors  reduces  the  voluntary  disclosure  of  information  by  business  
leaders,  consequently  raising  the  problem  of  adverse  selection  and  widening  the  price  spread.  
  
However,   according   to   agency   theory,   internal   directors   do   not   have   enough   power   to  
challenge  the  leadership  selection.  In  contrast,  external  directors  tend  to  weigh  more  favorably  
on   the   decisions   of   leaders,   who   would   thereby   be   more   constrained   to   regularly   provide  
information  to  the  market  (Dahya  et  al.,  2008).  The  signalling  theory    provides  a  framework  to  
explain   this   relationship.   In   fact,   external   directors   often   use   their   office   for   reporting   to  
external   markets.   They   specifically   target   parties   who   are   experts   in   making   decisions,   who  
know  the   importance  of  controlling  decision,  and  who  can  effectively  work  with  a  monitoring  
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system  to  chart  the  impact  of  a  decision.  This  is  seen  by  the  market  as  a  positive  signal,  thereby  
increasing  confidence  among  investors.  Along  with  these  assumptions,  the  external  directors  of  
the   board   effectively   control   managerial   decisions,   and   reduce   information   asymmetry  
between  management  and  investors.    
Chen   and   Jaggi   (2000)   highlighted   a   positive   link   through   the   examination   of   the   association  
between  external  directors  and  the  spread  of  information  in  Hong  Kong.  Their  results  indicate  
that   the   presence   of   independent   directors   enhances   corporate   compliance   with   regulatory  
requirements,  and  determines  the  transparency  of  the  market.  In  the  same  way,  Kanagaretnam  
et  al.  (2007)  examined  the  effect  of  board  characteristics  on  information  asymmetry  in  the  U.S.  
context,   around   the   announcement   dates   of   quarterly   results.   The   results   of   their   analysis  
showed  that  the  independence  and  activity  of  the  council,  along  with  the  percentage  of  capital  
held  by  the  directors  and  the  management  team,  associate  negatively  to  the  price  spread.  This  
result  contradicts  the  results  found  by  Ho  and  Wong  (2001).  Indeed,  using  data  from  Hong  Kong  
companies,  these  authors  showed  that  the  presence  of  independent  directors  does  not  affect  
the  spread  of  the  published  information.  In  addition,  when  it  comes  to  Canadian  firms  listed  in  
1996,  Attig  (2007)  demonstrated  that  the  presence  of  independent  directors  reduces  the  price  
spread.  Abbott  et  al.  (2004)  confirmed  this  result  on  a  sample  of  U.S  firms  over  the  period  1991-­‐
1999.    
Cheng   and   Courtenay   (2006),   Patelli   and   Prencipe   (2007)   and   Akhtaruddin   et   al.   (2009),   for  
instance,   provided   evidence   that   transparency   increases   in   line   with   the   number   of  
independent   directors   in   Singapore,   Italy,   and   Malaysia.   More   recently,   García-­‐Meca   and  
Sánchez-­‐Ballesta   (2010)   reached   the   same   conclusion   for   countries   with   high   investor  
protection  rights  after  meta-­‐analyzing  27  worldwide  empirical  studies.  
Thus  our  hypothesis  is  as  follows:  
H2:   The   degree   of   information   asymmetry   is   negatively   associated   with   the   percentage   of  
independent  directors  on  the  board  (boardIndep)  
  
The  Financial  Expertise  of  Directors  
Several   debates   on   corporate   governance   revolve   around   the   composition   of   boards   of  
directors.   The   potential   benefits   of   having   financial   expertise   at   the   organizational   level   of  
directors  was  studied  by  Güner  et  al.  (2008),  who  found  that  the  existence  of  directors  expert  in  
financial   control   could   affect   the   confidentiality   of   companies   through   the   creation   of   more  
accurate  information  and  better  audited  financial  states.  Wagner  (2008)  added  that  during  the  
composition  of  a  board,  a  compromise  must  exist  between   independence  and  competence   in  
order   to   create   an   optimally   efficient   group.   Thus,   the   existence   of   qualified   directors   is   an  
indicator  of  the  quality  of  published  information.  Haniffa  and  Cooke  (2002)  reported  that  firms  
with   a   higher   proportion   of   board   members   with   accounting   and   finance   expertise   tend   to  
disclose  more  voluntary  information  to  reflect  their  credibility  and  reputation.  
The  existence  of  expertise  within  the  board  of  directors  is  implied,  since  the  law  does  not  define  
the  criteria  or  the  nature  of  skills  required  for  directors.  It  was  only  with  the  publication  of  the  
Bouton  report  (2002)  that  we  started  talking  about  the  competence  of  directors  in  the  auditing  
of  companiĞ??financial  states.  This  report  stated  that  the  board  should  be  a  mix  of  expert  and  
experienced   directors.   It   further   explained   that   one   of   the   major   conditions   to   appoint   a  
director  is  his/her  competence.    
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The   Bouton   report   therefore   encouraged   companies   to   appoint   competent   directors   while  
simultaneously   remaining   silent   on   the   definition   of   that   competence.   For   this   reason,   this  
paper  has  explicitly   referred  to  the  work  of   Jeanjean  and  Stolowy   (2009),  Wagner   (2008)  and  
the   report   of   the   Blue   Ribbon   Committee   (1999).   Using   these   combined   sources,   we   can  
therefore  describe  as  financial  expert  any  director  who  meets  the  following  criteria:  
-­‐The   expert   (boardExp)   is   assigned   according   to   academic   training   (1)   and   /   or  
professional  experience  (2)  of  the  administrator.  
(1):  we  assign  financial  expertise  to  any  director  who  is  a  graduate  of  business  school  or  
university  in  the  field  of  management,  with  accounting  or  finance.  
(2):   we   assign   financial   expertise   to   any   director   who   has   exercised   or   exercises  
functions   dealing   with   finance.   In   this   way,   financial   managers,   financial   inspectors,  
auditors,   and   lawyers  with   an   accounts   specialism  or   similar   capacity   are   regarded   as  
financial  experts.  
  
According   to   this   classification   of   expertise,   a   binary   variable   takes   the   value   1   when   the  
director  is  a  financial  expert,  and  takes  0  otherwise.  
H3:     The  degree  of   information  asymmetry   is  negatively  associated  with  the  proportion  of   the  
board  with  accounting  and/or  finance  expertise  
  
Meeting  Frequency  of  the  Board  of  Directors  
To   ensure   efficiency   and   good   communication   from   the  management   team,   the   board  must  
keep  a  certain  regularity  in  the  meetings  of  directors.  The  establishment  of  a  well-­‐defined  plan  
of  meetings  and  the  publishing  of  reports  gives  more  confidence  to  stakeholders  and  reduces  
the  asymmetry  of  information  between  them.    
Neither   the  market  authorities  nor  the  Blue  Ribbon  Committee  will   be  drawn  on  the  optimal  
number  of  meetings  (Jenkins,  2002).  However,  a  Price  Waterhouse  document   (1993),  named:  
"ImprovinŐ?Ěŝ????ŝ??ĞĞWĞ?Ĩ?????ĐĞ͗?Ś???????Ğ??͕͟??ŐŐĞ???Ĩ????ĞĞ?ŝ?Ő??Ğ??Ğ??,  
with  the  addition  of  special  meetings  as  deemed  necessary.  
The  Viénot  report  argued  that  boards  must  meet  when  circumstances  require  and  that,  in  the  
absence  of   special   circumstances,   four   to   six  meetings   annually   are   sufficient   to  monitor   the  
progress   of   the   group   and   make   critical   decisions.   In   addition,   the   board   should   allow   a  
thorough   examination   and   discussion   of  matters   within   the   council's   jurisdiction   and   of   any  
powers  delegated  to  board  committees.  
Godard   and   Schatt   (2004)   described   the   main   characteristics   of   97   French   boards   and   their  
operations  in  2002.  They  found  the  average  number  of  meetings  to  be  about  7  times  a  year  (the  
median   is   6),   or   approximately   every   two   months.   The   results   of   the   study   conducted   by  
Godard  and  Schatt  also  show  strong  differences  between  firms4.  Jenkins  (2002)  showed  that  a  
greater  frequency  of  committee  meetings  contributes  to  a  better  quality  of  financial  reporting.  
Vafeas  (1999)  argued  that  the  time  needed  to  gather  sensitive   information   in  preparation  for  
board  meetings  makes   the   dates   of   these  meetings   important.   Board   directors   require   deep  
background   knowledge   and   timely   updates   about   firm   activities   and   results.   Thus,   a   higher  
meeting   frequency   implies   greater   pressure   on   managers   to   provide   supplementary  
                                                                                                                    4  Authors  found  that  less  than  15%  of  boards  now  meet  four  or  fewer  times  per  year.  
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information.   This   view   is   supported   by   Brick   and   Chidambaran   (2010),   who   suggested   that  
frequent  board  (and  audit  committee)  meetings  are  a  pledge  to  continuously  share  information  
with   managers.   Beasley   et   al.   (2000)   provided   evidence   that   a   lower   frequency   of   audit  
committee   meetings   is   associated   with   a   higher   likelihood   of   financial   statement   fraud.   A  
similar  study  by  Farber  (2005)  showed  that  the  audit  committees  of  firms  engaged  in  fraudulent  
activities  have  fewer  independent  members  and  do  not  meet  frequently.  
Drawing  on  the  above-­‐?Ğ??ŝ??ĞĚ???ĚŝĞ?͕?ĞĞ??ĞĐ??ď???Ě??high  meeting   frequency  to  be  
related  to  less  information  asymmetry.  Hence,  we  posit  the  following  hypothesis.  
The  variable  (boardMeet)  measures  the  number  of  meetings  conducted  during  one  year.  
H4:   The   degree   of   information   asymmetry   is   negatively   associated   with   frequency   of   board  
meetings.    
  
Meeting  attendance    
Irregular   attendance   at   meetings   of   the   board   of   directors   is   incompatible   with   the   due  
diligence  of  directors  and  best  practice  corporate  governance  principles.  Greater  participation  
in  board  meetings  allows  directors  to  provide  useful  advice,  share  points  of  view,  and  benefit  of  
Ğ?ĐŚ ??ŚĞ??? Ğ??Ğ?ŝĞ?ĐĞ͘Hence,   a   higher   attendance   rate   decreases   information   asymmetry  
between  directors  and  promotes  more  effective  functioning  of  the  board  and   its  committees.  
Moreover,  busy  directors  are  less  likely  to  question  managerial  proposals  and  decisions  and  are  
therefore   less   effective  monitors.   In   this   respect,   Jiraporn  et   al.   (2009)   and  Ahn  et   al.   (2010)  
suggested  that  directors  holding  multiple  outside  directorships  face  tight  time  constraints,  and  
their  limited  attention  capacities  may  hamper  their  capacity  to  properly  fulfill  their  monitoring  
duties,  which  in  turn  negatively  affects  firm  performance.  
Similarly,  Ferris  et  al.  (2003)  posit  that,  due  to  lack  of  time,  busy  directors  are  often  unable  to  
serve   on   various   board   committees.   The   complexity   of   accounting   and   financial   reports  
reviewed  by  the  audit  committee  requires  significant  resources  in  terms  of  directors  and  time  
spent   in   ???ŝ???ŝ?Ő͘ ZĞŐ???? ???Ğ?Ě??ĐĞ ?? ď???Ě ?ĞĞ?ŝ?Ő? ?Ś??? Ěŝ?ĞĐ????? ?????Ő
commitment   to   earnestly   perform   their   supervision   duties.   Their   presence   pressures   top  
management   to   provide   further   information   to   reduce   oversight.   Moreover,   directors   who  
usually   attend   board  meetings   (boardDili)   are   expected   to   ask   for  more   detailed   and   varied  
information  to  assess  management  performance,  implying  more  transparency.  In  light  of  these  
arguments,  we  present  the  following  hypothesis.  
H5:  The  degree  of  information  asymmetry  is  negatively  associated  with  participation  in  board  of  
director  meetings.  
  
The  unitary  structure  of  the  board  
Companies   in  which  a  single  person  combines  the  roles  of  CEO  and  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  
Directors  are  considered  to  have  a  unitary  board  in  the  Board.      
The  Act  of  May  15,  2001  helped   to  bring  a  better   separation  of   roles   in   the  SA  classic  board.    
Following   the   recommendations   of   the   Viénot   report   (1999),   inspired   by   the   Anglo-­‐Saxon  
model,  the  functions  of  Chairman  of  the  Board  and  CEO  can  be  separated.  The  chairmanship  of  
a   company?? ŐĞ?Ğ??? ????ŐĞ?Ğ??   can   be   provided   either   by   the   Chairman   of   the   Board   of  
Directors  or  by  a  person  appointed  by  him/her,  with  the  title  of  CEO.  
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The  concentration  of  power  in  decision  making  caused  by  the  overlapping  functions  of  control  
and   decision   making   (duality)   by   the   officer   may   compromise   the   board??   independence,  
damaging   the  board   and   its   oversight   role   of   governance   (Fama   and   Jensen,   1983;  Millstein,  
1992;  Whittington,  1993;  Brickley  et  al.  1994;  Worrell  et  al.,  1997).    
In   fact,   this   duality   both   highlights   the   absence   of   separation   between   decision   control   and  
decision  management,  and  additionally   indicates  that  the  board   is  not  an  effective  means  for  
decision  control  if  it  does  not  limit  the  discretion  of  individual  decisions  by  top  managers  (Fama  
and  Jensen,  1983).  
The  role  of  governance  and  oversight  may  extend  to  the  dissemination  of  information  from  the  
firm  to  the  external  directors.  Firms  with  a  dual  executive  will   therefore  have  a  weak   level  of  
voluntary  disclosure,  because  the  board  seems  to  be  less  effective  in  controlling    management  
and  ensuring  a  high  level  of  transparency.  Such  a  low  level  of  transparency  can  be  used  to  hide  
fraud   and   incompetence   (Gul   and   Leung,   2004).   The   results   of   a   study   by   Cai   et   al.   (2006)  
revealed  that  the  separation  of  functions  enhances  the  process  of  information  dissemination  to  
the  public  and  reduces  the  opportunities  for  informed  trading.  Nevertheless,  both  the  theory  of  
stewardship   and   the   theory   of   resource   dependence   assert   that   the   concentration   of   CEO  
power  is  beneficial  to  the  company,  since  it  facilitates  decisions  making  and  the  acquisition  of  
resources  necessary   for  the  company.  Haniffa  and  Cooke   (2002)  noted  a  negative  association  
between   the   presence   of   an   external   officer   and   a   voluntary   disclosure   of   information   for  
Malaysian  companies.  These  results  refute  the  hypothesis  suggesting  that  an  external  chairman  
strengthens   the   independence  of   the  board  of  directors.   Haniffa  and  Cooke   (2002)   conclude,  
therefore,  that  the  executive  chairman  of  the  board  plays  an  important  role  in  holding  private  
information.  
  
Moreover,  Ho  and  Wong  (2001)  showed  that  the  cumulative  distribution  of  functions  does  not  
affect   voluntary   information   disclosure.   They   explain   this   by   the   fact   that   the   person   jointly  
holding  the  positions  of  CEO  and  Chairman  of  the  Board  is  generally  a  major  shareholder  of  the  
company.   Depending   on   the   existence   or   absence   of   a   dual   function,   the   variable   (Dual)   is  
defined  as  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  the  council  is  unitary  and  to  0  otherwise.  
H6:   The   degree   of   information   asymmetry   is   negatively   associated   with   the   presence   of   a  
unitary  structure.  
  
2.  SAMPLE  AND  METHODOLOGY  
2.1.  Data-­‐gathering  
Our  sample  includes  all  industrial  and  commercial  companies  listed  in  the  Paris  stock  exchange.  
The   initial   sample   was   composed   by   469   companies   for   the   years   2008,   2009   and   2010.  
Financial   companies  were   excluded.   A   significant   amount   of  missing   or   unavailable   data   has  
made  it  necessary  to  abandon  a  large  section  of  this  initial  sample.  The  final  sample  therefore  
comprised  160  firms.  
Financial  data   related  to  stock  prices,  trading  volumes,  and  bid  and  ask  prices  were  retrieved  
from   the   Thomson   Reuters   and   Orbis   databases.   The   information   concerned   with   the  
governance  mechanisms  were   also   partially   collected   via   these   databases.   Dafsaliens,  Who's  
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Who,  and  Top  Management  also  made  up  a  necessary  complement  in  order  to  define    expertise  
and  administrator  independence.    
  
2.2  Definition  and  variables  measures  
2.2.1.  The  information  asymmetry    
In   order-­‐driven  markets,   such   as   the   Paris   stock-­‐exchange,   the   spread   is   determined   by   the  
order  book,  and  is  equal  to  the  difference  between  the  best  price  associated  with  a  selling  limit  
order   (ask   price)   and   the   best   price   associated  with   a   buying   limit   order   (bid   price).  Market  
microstructure  literature  shows  that  the  spread  comprises  three  components:  order  processing  
costs;  adverse  selection  costs;  and  inventory  holding  costs.  The  adverse  selection  component  of  
the  spread  balances  the  liquidity  of  suppliers   in  transacting  with  better   informed  traders,  and  
increases  with  the  degree  of  information  asymmetry.    
  
Empirically,  several  analyses  present  methods  to  estimate  the  spread  components.  Huang  and  
Stoll  (1997)  proposed  the  consideration  of  two  broad  classes  of  spread  decomposition  models.  
The   first   class   decomposes   the   spread   using   serial   covariance   properties   of   quotes   and  
transaction  prices.  Models  were  developed  by  Stoll  (1989)  and  George,  Kaul,  and  Nimalendran  
(1991),  based  on  Roll  (1984),  and  Choi,  Salandro,  and  Shastri??  (1988)  estimations  of  the  spread.  
The   second  class  uses  a   trade  direction   indicator   regression   to  decompose   the   spread.  These  
trade   indicator  models  are  mainly  driven  by  whether   incoming  orders  are  purchases  or  sales,  
and   the   response   of   the   price   to   this   order   arrival.  Models   are   those   of   Glosten   and   Harris  
(1988),  Lin,  Sanger  and  Booth  (1995),  Madhavan,  Richardson,  and  Roomans  (1996)  and  Huang  
and  Stoll  (1997).  
Clarke   and   Shastri   (2001),   Van  Ness,   Van  Ness  et  Warr   (2001)   and  Winne   and  Majois   (2004)  
view  this  model  as  one  of  the  most  appropriate  to  study  the  bid-­‐ask  spread  components.  This  
method   therefore  appears   to  be   the  most  appropriate   for   the  Paris   stock-­‐exchange,  and  also  
the  most   robust   concerning   components   estimation.   Lin,   Sanger   and   Booth   (1995)   designed  
their  model5  on  the  basis  of  Huang  and  Stoll  (1994),  Lin  (1992)  and  S????????????ĐŚ??????͘  
  
2.3.  Methodology  
Our  methodology  relies  on   linear  regression  using  the  method  of  ordinary   least  square  (OLS).  
We   apply   a   logistic   transformation   for   financial   variables   (trading   volume,   share   price   and  
volatility)  to  convert  bounded  variables  to  unbounded  ones.    



































2.4  Analysis  and  results  discussion  
2.4.1.  Descriptive  analysis  
Table  1  provides  the  set  of  statistic  variables  and  the  results  of  the  univaried  tests.  
                                                                                                                    5  Further  details  to  be  found  in  Lin,  Sanger  et  Booth  (1995)    
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Table  1:  Descriptive  statistics    
  




et     boardDili  
  Mean     9.6     0.37     6.47     0.87  
  Median     8.00     0.36     6.00     0.89  
  
Maximum     22.00     1.00     23.00     1.00  
  Minimum     3.00     0.00     2.00     0.00  
  Std.  Dev.     4.25     5.24     3.08     9.25  
              
   Dual   boardExp        
Frequency   0.58     0.51          
  
As  Table  1  shows,  the  designated  variables  express  the  different  aspects  of  firm  governance  for  
the  sample.  They  stand  as  a  sample  that  takes  into  account  a  whole  set  of  heterogeneous  firms  
with   distinctive   specificities.   In   fact,   the   size   of   the  board   of   administration   foreshadows   the  
existent   divergences   between   the   firms   made   of   a   restricted   number   of   administrators   (3  
members)  and  the  ones  counting  22  sitting  members.    Similarly,  the  number  of  meetings  reflect  
the  existence  of  an  over-­‐activity  of  some  of  the  sample  firms  boards  compared  to  the  average  
(23  meetings  compared  to  an  average  of  6  meetings),    though  there  are  other  French  firms  that  
hold  meetings   only   twice   a   year.   The   other   chosen   variables   reflect   the   same   observations.  
They  generally  highlight  the  inexistence  of  a  clear  consensus  and  standard  in  French  corporate  
governance.      The   absence   of   laws   setting   minimal   proportions,   quotas,   and   the   different  
characteristics   of   the   governance   activity   taken   into   consideration   in   this   study,   mirrors   a  
French  legislative  flexibility.  This  flexibility  continues  to  influence  governance  practices  despite  
the  passing  of  the  3rd  July  20086    law.  
  
  2.4.2.  The  correlation  study    
According   to   Gujarati   (2004),   a   serious   problem   of   multicolinearity   exists   when   correlations  
between  the  independent  variables  exceed  0.80,  which  is  not  the  case  in  the  present  study.  The  
                                                                                                                    
6   The   articles   26   to   30   of   the   3rd   July   2008   aim   to   increase   ?ŚĞ Ě??ŝĞ? ?Ĩ Đ?????ŝĞ?? ????????Ğ?Đ? ŝ? ?Ğ??? ?Ĩ
enterprise   government   and   internal   control.   These   companies   are   bound   to   the   precise   code   of   the   enterprise  
government,  which  they  have  chosen  to  be  its  point  of  reference.    In  the  absence  of  the  latter,  a  company  would  
refer  to  its  retained  rules  as  a  complement  to  the  law??  requirements;      
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VIF  (variance  inflation  factor)  values  were  computed  to  check  for  the  existence  of  this  problem.  
They   range   between   1.6   and   2.7,   far   below   the   critical   value   of   10   (Neter,  Wasserman,   and  
Kunter,  1989).  The  
correlations  
between   the  
independent  
variables   do   not  
therefore   seem   to  
be   the   originator  




Table   2:  
Correlation  
















boardSiz   1,0000   ,2014   ,3796   ,1907   ,0357   2,74
5  
        ,000   ,000   ,000   ,447     
boardInd
ep  
   1,0000   ,2348   ,0090   -­‐,1427   2,48
2  
           ,000   ,848   ,002     
boardExp         1,0000   ,2010   -­‐,1854   2,52
1  
              ,000   ,000     
boardMe
et  
         1,0000   ,0393   1,86
6  
                 ,402     
boardDili               1,0000   2,32
5  
      International  Journal  of  Academic  Research  in  Business  and  Social  Sciences  
                 December  2013,  Vol.  3,  No.  12  
ISSN:  2222-­‐6990  
  




2.4.3.  Multivariate  Analysis  and  Discussion  
  
Table  3  summarizes  the  results  of  the  multivariate  regression  models.  The  adjusted  R2  is  64.2  
percent   and   some   of   the   board   characteristics   have   a   significant   t-­‐value,   which   implies   that  
board  characteristics  have  some  explanatory  power  on  information  asymmetry.    

























***,  **,  *  T-­‐statistics  are  significant  at  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  levels  respectively.  
  
We   note   a   negative   relationship   between   adverse   selection   and   board   size.   This  means   that  
information   asymmetry   is   lower  when   the   size  of   the   board   of   directors   is   high.   This   finding  
corroborates   our   first   hypothesis   and   is   consistent   with   the   result   found   by   Agrawal   and  
Knoeber  (1999).  Indeed,  a  large  board  size  provides  enhanced  supervision  and  ensures  greater  
transparency  of  financial  information,  confirming  the  dependency  theory.  This  result  is  justified  
by  the  reduction  of  the  adverse  selection  component  and  converges  with  Cai  et  al.  (2006).  
Similarly,   our   findings   suggest   that   a   higher   proportion   of   independent   directors   have   a  
negative   impact   on   information   asymmetry.   The   board   of   directors?   independence   is   also  
another   important  aspect  of  board  effectiveness.   To  fulfill   their  duties,   independent  directors  
                      
   adverse  selection  
Constante   -­‐0.352  *      -­‐1.909  
boardSiz   -­‐3,251***      (-­‐4,582)  
boardIndep   -­‐1.181***      (-­‐8.916)  
boardExp   -­‐0.124**      (-­‐2.679)  
boardMeet   -­‐0.166  **      (-­‐2.749)  
boardDili   -­‐0,028  ***  
  
   (-­‐3,621)  
Dual   0,161       
  
   1,182  
VOLAT   0.304  ***      5.316  
PRICE   -­‐0.188***        (-­‐8.794)  
AVOL   -­‐0.232***      (-­‐16.784)  
R2   0,642  
F-­‐statistic   33,95  (0,000)  
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may   request   extensive   and   complementary   information   other   than   financial   statements,  
thereby  inducing  managers  to  release  more  voluntary  information.  This  result  is  in  conformity  
with  agency  theory,  which  suggests   that  the  board  of  director  has  ultimate  accountability  for  
ensuring   the   reliability,   integrity,   and   transp??Ğ?Đ? ?Ĩ ?ŚĞ Ĩŝ???? Ĩŝ???Đŝ?? ?Ğ????ŝ?Ő ????Ğ?
(Jensen,  1993).  
Concerning   the   financial   administrator's   experience,   it   appears   that   this   has   a   negative   and  
significant   impact   on   adverse   selection;   the   existence   of   financial   administrator   experts,  
acquiring   financial   expertise   throughout   their   careers,   improves   transparency   of   the   French  
companies.  
In  the  same  way,  we  observe  that  the  high  number  of  board  meetings  has  a  positive  influence  
on  the  transparency  of  the  French  companies.  More  specifically,  its  impact  is  strongly  justified  
by   the   negative   sign   of   the   adverse   selection   component   of   the   spread.   Similar   to   Brick   and  
Chidambaran   (2010),  we   suggest   that   frequent   board  meetings   are   a  pledge   to   continuously  
share   information   with   managers.   A   sufficient   number   of   board   meetings   can   lead   to  
monitoring  effectiveness,  pressuring  management  to  improve  their  disclosure  decisions.  
H5   predicts   a   negative   relationship   between   board   diligence   and   the   degree   of   information  
asymmetry.  To  this  extent,  board  diligence  was  found  to  be  significant  at  a  1  percent  level,  but  
in  the  opposite  direction.  Contrary  to  prior  studies  (Jiraporn  et  al.,  2009;  Ahn  et  al.,  2010),  our  
results  suggest  that  meeting  attendance  resulted  in  a  higher  degree  of  information  asymmetry.  
This   could   be   explainĞĚ ď? '????? Ĩ???Ğ????͕ ?ŚŝĐŚ defines   secrecy   as   ͞a   preference   for  
confidentiality  and  the  restriction  of  disclosure  of  information  about  the  business  only  to  those  
who  are  closely  involved  with  its  management  and  financing  as  opposed  to  a  more  Transparent,  
??Ğ???Ě??ď?ŝĐ???ĐĐ?????ď?Ğ??????ĐŚ͘͟?'???͕?????͘  This  may  additionally  be  explained  by  
the  argument  that  directors  are  more  likely  to  establish  personal  ties  with  firm  insiders  they  are  
supposed  to  monitor  when  they  participate   frequently   in  boards  meetings,  which  can  reduce  
the   effectiveness   of   monitoring,   including   that   of   disclosure   decisions   (Patelli   and   Prencipe,  
2007).   Moreover,   an   audit   committee   that   meets   frequently   with   all   its   members   sends   a  
message  of  continuous  monitoring  to  the  market,  reducing  transparency.  
However,   the   existence   of   a   monist   structure   at   the   level   of   French   companies?   boards   of  
administration  has  no  statistically  significant  effect  on  the  adverse  selection  component  of  the  
spread.      
The  relationship  between  trading  volume  and  adverse  selection  is  negative  and  significant  at  a  
1   percent   level.   This   result   supports   the   predictions   of   Demsetz   (1968)   and   Tinic   (1972).   An  
increase  in  trading  volume  is  often  associated  with  an  increased  capacity  of  operators  to  carry  
out  transactions  without  any  impact  on  prices.  This,  in  turn,  allows  a  decrease  in  the  risk  related  
to   the   maintenance   of   stocks   and   thus   a   shrink   in   bid-­‐ask   spreads.   Thus,   the   more   trading  
volume  increases,  the  more  the  adverse  selection  is  reduced.  The  volatility  of  prices  positively  
and  significantly  influences  adverse  selection.  This  result  is  consistent  with  that  of  Sarin,  Shastri  
and  Shastri  (2000).  As  stock  returns  are  volatile,  the  probability  of  negotiating  with  an  informed  
investor   increases.   Investors   are   subsequently   inclined   to   increase   their   bid   prices   and   to  
decrease  their  ask  prices,  widening  the  adverse  selection.  The  coefficient  of  share  price  variable  
is   negative   and   significant.   This   result   indicates   that   the   shares   with   weak   price   have   large  
adverse  selection.    
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3.  Conclusion  
In   this   paper,   we   have   analysed   the   relationship   between   the   corporate   governance  
characteristics   and   the   selection   adverse   component   of   160   companies   listed   in   the   French  
market.  The  set  of  information  required  for  this  study  was  collected  for  the  period  2008-­‐2010.  
We   note   a   direct   relationship   between   the   quality   of   corporate   governance   and   adverse  
selection  costs  of  French  firms.  In  fact,  our  results  show  that  corporate  governance  mechanisms  
measured  via  the  board  of  administration  size,  the  independence  and  the  financial  expertise  of  
the  administrators,  the  number  of  the  board  of  administration  meetings,  and  board  diligence,  
cause  a  reduction  of  adverse  information  asymmetry.    
In  light  of  our  result,  we  support  the  contention  that  a  system  of  efficient  corporate  governance  
ameliorates   transparency,   raises   the   investor   confidence   in   the  markets,  and  can  attract  new  
investors.      
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